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The Role of Inventories
In the Business Cycle
hanges in the stock of firms’ inventories are
an important component of the business
cycle. In fact, discussion about the timing
of a recovery following economic recessions
often focuses on inventories. Aubhik Khan surveys the
facts about inventory investment over the business
cycle, then discusses two leading theories that may
explain these observations.





Changes in the stock of firms’
inventories are an important component
of the business cycle.  Alan Blinder, a
former Governor of the Federal Reserve
System, famously remarked that “the
business cycle, to a surprisingly large
degree, is an inventory cycle.”  Consis-
tent with this perspective, much of the
discussion about the timing of a
recovery following economic recessions
focuses on firms’ stocks of inventories.
Pundits suggest that production and
employment cannot recover until firms’
inventories fall, relative to their sales.
This article surveys the facts
about inventory investment over the
business cycle, then discusses two
leading theories of inventory investment
that may explain these observations.
Theory that passes the test of observa-
tion may allow us, with some confi-
dence, to predict future movements in
the data. Theories that have sought to
explain macroeconomic changes in
inventory investment have generally
focused on firms’ attempts to (1) reduce
the costs of adjusting their production
level or (2) reduce the costs of placing
orders for intermediate goods.  While
much of the research on inventories in
the past 50 years has emphasized the
cost of adjusting production, this
approach has had well-known difficul-
ties when confronted with the data.
Recent work that has focused on
reducing the fixed costs of ordering
goods may provide a framework that is
more consistent with the facts.  At the
same time, this recent work may
produce new insights about the
interaction between inventories and the
macroeconomy.  These two theories
predict different behavior for aggregate
production, sales, and inventory
investment.
INVENTORIES SEEM
TO BE IMPORTANT IN THE
BUSINESS CYCLE
Figure 1 shows the business-
cycle component of real gross domestic
product (GDP) in the United States
over most of the postwar period. We can
think of movements in GDP as the sum
of two components: the trend and the
business cycle.  The trend represents the
average growth rate of the economy
across surrounding years. The business
cycle reflects short-term deviations from
this trend: the expansions and contrac-
tions that make up the business cycle.1,2
For comparison, recessions, as dated by
the National Bureau of Economic
Research, are shaded in the figure.
The figure also includes
changes in the stock of private nonfarm
inventories (private refers to nongovern-
ment).  The difference between GDP,
the sum of all goods and services
produced in the economy over a given
period, and final sales, the sum of all
goods and services sold, is known as net
inventory investment. Net inventory
1 Actually, any type of expenditure or output
may be broken down into a business-cycle
component and a trend.  The process of
isolating the business-cycle component is
known as “detrending” or “filtering.”  The
real quarterly series in the figure have been
detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott filter
using a smoothing parameter of 1600. For
additional details, see Edward C. Prescott’s
paper.
2 It then follows that a recession, in this
approach to business cycles, is a period in
which the economy is growing at rates that
are lower than its trend.  This contrasts with
the conventional use of the term recession to
describe a period of negative growth.  Business Review  Q3  2003   39 www.phil.frb.org
investment is a measure of goods that
have been made but not sold to
consumers nor used by a firm as an
intermediate input into production.
A car made by Honda in Ohio,
completed but retained unused in the
factory, adds to Honda’s stock of
inventories. Steel bought by the same
manufacturer but left unused is a raw
material that also adds to Honda’s stock
of inventories. Nonfarm private
inventories are essentially stocks of these
final goods, intermediate inputs,
materials, or supplies held by businesses.
Changes in this component of total
inventory investment account for most
of the change in total inventories over
the business cycle.
Cyclicality and Volatility. In
organizing their thinking about the role
of an economic variable such as
inventory investment over the business
cycle, economists focus on the cyclicality
and volatility of the variable.  A
variable’s cyclicality — formally, its
correlation with real GDP — is a
measure of how the variable changes
over the business cycle. For example, net
exports — that is, exports minus imports
— are countercyclical: they fall as GDP
rises during an expansion, and they rise
as GDP declines in a recession.
In contrast, consumption and
investment are pro-cyclical: they rise
during expansions and fall, alongside
GDP , in recessions.  A significant
correlation, whether positive or negative,
between any economic variable and
GDP suggests that the variable is
cyclical in that it varies in a systematic
way with GDP over the business cycle.
This is not true of all economic variables.
For example, government spending is
acyclical: it shows no significant
correlation with economy activity over
the business cycle, neither rising nor
falling systematically.
While the cyclicality of a
variable measures the extent to which it
rises or falls with GDP , volatility mea-
sures the size of the variable’s total
fluctuation over the business cycle.3
Economic variables differ considerably
in their volatility. For example, consump-
tion of nondurable goods and services is
far less volatile than GDP , while business
investment and consumption of
consumer durable goods are more
volatile — i.e., they have bigger swings.
Thus, investment fluctuates a lot more
than does the consumption of nondu-
rables and services as output rises and
falls.
Net inventory investment is
pro-cyclical (Figure 1). It moves along
with GDP , rising during expansions and
falling during recessions. This is a very
important observation because it means
that a common view of inventories —
that they are goods that firms were
unable to sell — can’t explain most of
the movements in inventories.  In an
expansion, inventories grow as consump-
tion and investment grow. That is, when
sales rise, inventories also rise.  If
inventories were mainly goods that firms
couldn’t sell, they would tend to rise
when sales fell.
By definition GDP = Final
Sales + Net Inventory Investment.
Thus, any change in GDP must be
attributable to either a change in final
sales or a change in net inventory
investment.  Let’s look at the fraction of
the change in GDP that can be
accounted for by changes in net
inventory investment. To accomplish
this, we divide the change in inventories
during recessions by the corresponding
change in GDP .  The result is a number
around one-half.  Almost half of the fall
FIGURE 1
GDP, Final Sales, and Changes in Nonfarm In-
ventories
3 Formally, we define volatility as the
standard deviation of the business-cycle
component of the quarterly data.40   Q3  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
in production experienced by the U.S.
economy during a recession may be
explained by a reduction in net
inventory investment.  This is a
surprisingly large fraction when one
considers that net inventory investment
is, on average, only around 0.5 percent
of GDP . It indicates that inventory
investment is extremely volatile.
Adding to the Volatility of
Output. The pro-cyclicality and
extreme volatility of inventory invest-
ment have led researchers to suggest
that inventories are a destabilizing force.
At its simplest, their argument is as
follows. Inventory investment and final
sales tend to move together: both rise
during expansions, and both fall during
recessions.  Consequently, GDP varies
by more than it would if inventory
investment were constant or negatively
correlated with final sales.
To understand this better,
consider the following simple example. If
final sales rise during odd years and fall
during even years, while inventory
investment rises (by the same amount)
during even years and falls during odd
years, there’s no effect on GDP .
Inventory investment and final sales
move in opposite directions; they are
negatively correlated. As a result, each
offsets the change in the other. Produc-
tion is smoothed.
Now, consider an alternative
case in which both series rise during odd
years. Since inventory investment moves
with output, and since it’s highly
volatile, inventories substantially raise
the volatility of GDP .  Since final sales
and inventory investment are indeed
positively correlated, typically rising and
falling at the same time, researchers
have concluded that inventories are a
destabilizing force in the economy. (See
Are Inventories Becoming Less Promi-
nent?) Changes in inventories magnify




Economists are not satisfied
merely to uncover the facts about
inventories and the business cycle.
Their primary goal is to explain these
findings. Before we may begin to
understand why firms change their
holdings of inventories over the business
cycle, we must have an understanding
of why firms hold inventories at all. For
economic theory, this has been more of a
mystery than you might suppose.
Why would a firm produce
goods but not sell them? Sales com-
pleted today give the firm income that it
may invest. For example, even if the
firm has no other immediate use for the
funds, it might deposit them in an
interest-earning account. A firm would
forgo this interest income if it chooses
not to sell its goods immediately.
But perhaps it isn’t voluntary.
You may think firms hold inventories
only of finished goods they have been
unable to sell. While firms do sometimes
accumulate inventories of unsold goods
because of weaker-than-expected
demand, this can’t be the central
explanation of inventory holdings. First,
remember that inventories rise when
sales do.  Second, goods that have been
produced but not yet sold are only a
fraction of the total stock of inventories.
Firms also hold inventories of inputs they
use to produce their goods, buying them
before they need them.
The answer to the question of
why firms forgo interest income must
involve benefits derived from holding
inventories. Holding stocks of invento-
ries must somehow reduce a firm’s cost
of production, and these cost savings
must exceed the forgone interest.
There are two theories of how
production costs induce firms to hold
stocks of inventories.  The first, known
as the production-smoothing model of
inventories, emphasizes the costs of
adjusting production. The second,
known as the (S, s) model of inventories,
emphasizes the costs of accepting
deliveries. While each of these theories
can explain why firms hold inventories,
they are commonly applied to different
types of inventories.  Thus, the two
theories are not mutually exclusive; both
may be relevant to an understanding of
the overall stock of inventories.
However, as with all science,
the empirical relevance of these
alternative theories can be assessed by
evaluating their predictions against the
data.  The production-smoothing model
and the (S, s) model generally have
distinct predictions about the joint





model explains why a manufacturing
firm holds stocks of goods produced but
unsold.  The model assumes that it is
costly for the manufacturing firm to
adjust production.
It is costly to buy and install
new equipment or to uninstall and sell
off previously installed equipment.
Workers are costly to hire and train, and
layoffs are also expensive.  Since chang-
ing levels of output often involve
changing the size of the labor force and
purchasing new capital equipment,
these adjustment costs are inevitable for a
firm that changes its level of output over
time. It’s reasonable to assume that these
costs of changing production levels
actually increase with the size of the
change.  For example, a large increase in
production requires hiring more workers
and, thus, involves higher training costs.
In any case, given these costs of adjust-
ing production, if sales are volatile, a
firm may prefer not to vary production
to match the variation in sales. Instead,
it may use inventories of already
produced goods to offset the difference
between production and sales.  Business Review  Q3  2003   41 www.phil.frb.org
ARE INVENTORIES BECOMING LESS PROMINENT?
If inventories are indeed a destabilizing element
of aggregate economic activity, perhaps the much heralded
improvements in technology that have led to sharp declines
in the inventory to sales ratio will eventually yield a less
severe business cycle. Since inventories seem to explain so
much of the decline in output during recessions, and since
they amplify the effect of changes in final sales on GDP , as
inventory levels decline, perhaps GDP will be subject to less
severe fluctuations.
Arguments such as this have led economists to
emphasize the decline in the inventory to sales ratio. In
Figure 2, we see the nominal stock of inventories as a ratio
of final sales.  Clearly, it has declined sharply since the early
1980s. Many observers have regarded this decline as the
result of improvements in technology and management
methods that have allowed firms to reduce their holdings
of inventories relative to their sales. This is less clear from
the figure. First, we see that the
inventory to sales ratio rose sharply
in the 1970s.  If technological
innovation has reduced the ratio
since the 1980s, what was the sharp
technological regress in the 1970s?
Second, and related, is the finding
that the inventory to sales ratio was
as low in the late 1960s as it was in
the mid 1980s.
Even the decline in the
importance of inventories is less clear
than is commonly acknowledged.
The figure also plots the real
inventory to sales ratio, that is, the
ratio when both inventories and
sales figures have been divided by
their price indexes. While the
nominal inventory to sales ratio
shows a clear negative trend over
the past 20 to 25 years, the real
inventory to sales ratio displays no
corresponding decline! This implies
that the price index for inventories
has fallen more slowly than that for
final sales. It would seem that
changes in the relative price of
intermediate inputs and materials and supplies, both
components of the overall stock of inventories but not part
of final sales, must account for the divergence between the
real and nominal ratios of inventories to sales.
While I cannot suggest which ratio is more
sensible, Figure 2 casts some doubt on some of the discus-
sion of technological improvements’ role in reducing
demand for inventories. While both the financial press and
policymakers have repeatedly mentioned the important
role of improved management techniques, such as just-in-
time production methods, in reducing firms’ dependence
on inventories, the real inventory to sales ratio in Figure 2
suggests caution before making sweeping generalizations.
When examining the nominal inventory to sales ratio, we
see that it rose before it fell, something that is hard to
explain using technological improvement.  The real ratio
has not declined consistently over the past 20 years.
FIGURE 2
Quarterly Nominal and Real Inventory
to Sales Ratios42   Q3  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
For example, a toy maker
knows that sales are always higher
during the Christmas season. However,
since it is expensive to hire a large
number of workers in the last quarter of
the year, the toy company may produce
more toys than it sells over the first nine
months. During these nine months,
production exceeds sales, and the toy
company accumulates inventories.  At
the end of the year, when demand rises,
the toy factory has fewer workers than it
needs to satisfy sales.  But even though
production is lower than Christmas sales,
the company can sell off its accumu-
lated inventories to meet the increased
demand. Accumulating inventories
from January through September lets
the toy maker smooth production
relative to sales; that is, production is less
volatile than sales, and when sales rise,
inventories fall.
The defining assumption of
the production-smoothing model is that
there are costs of adjusting the level of
production in a firm and that these costs
rise in proportion to the extent of the
adjustment.  The central prediction of
the production-smoothing model is that,
at least to the extent that there are
fluctuations in the demand for a firm’s
products, its production will vary less
than its sales, and when its sales are
high, inventories will be reduced. If all
firms behave this way, we should see, for
the economy as a whole: (1) GDP less
volatile than final sales and (2) a
negative correlation between final sales
and inventory investment.
The Dilemma with Invento-
ries as a Buffer Against Changes in
Sales. There are two difficulties with
the production-smoothing model (Table
1). The first row of the first column
shows a measure of the volatility — the
standard deviation — of the business-
cycle component of GDP . The first rows
of the next two columns report the
relative volatility of final sales and net
inventory investment.  The relative
TABLE 1
GDP, Final Sales, and Inventory Investment
volatility of final sales is the ratio of the
standard deviation of final sales divided
by that of GDP itself.  This gives us a
measure of how much sales fluctuate
relative to GDP . For example, we see
that the relative volatility of final sales is
82 percent of that of GDP . At least at
the aggregate level, production is more
volatile than sales.
In the third row of the second
column, we also find that the correlation
between final sales and inventory
investment is actually positive. Both the
higher variability of production and this
correlation contradict the predictions of
the basic production-smoothing model
described above. If production is more
volatile than sales, inventories are not
effective in smoothing production. This
evidence — which also holds for
countries other than the U.S. and for
individual industries and even for firms
— offers no support for the view that
smoothing production is an important
motive for holding inventories.
Attempts to Adapt the
Model to Fit the Facts.  By adjusting
the production- smoothing model to fit
the data, both Valerie Ramey and
Martin Eichenbaum have developed
solutions to the problems with the basic
production-smoothing model.
In her paper, Ramey suggests
that firms may actually prefer to bunch
their production because unit costs fall
as they produce more. This is known as
increasing returns. Ramey and Daniel
Vine studied an interesting example of
increasing returns in the automobile
industry that is a result of contracts
between manufacturers and labor
unions.  They argued that these
contracts broadly imply that if an
automobile manufacturer employs
workers for less than 40 hours in any
given week, it must also pay them 85
percent of the earnings lost in working
less than a full week, but only if the
workers work at all.4
Consider the following
example, which highlights the implica-
tions of such a wage contract. Assume
that an automobile manufacturer sells
75 cars a week. If its workers work a full
week (40 hours), they produce 100 cars.
4 Thus, if a worker is paid $10 an hour and is
employed full time for 40 hours, he is paid
$400 for the week. However, if he is employed
for 35 hours, he is paid $350 for the time he
worked and 85 percent of the $50 he would
have earned for the five hours he did not
work or $392.50 in total. Finally, if he does
not work at all in a week, he is not paid at all.
Net Inventory
GDP Final Sales Investment
Percent Standard Deviation
Relative to GDP 1.675 0.824 0.282
Correlation with GDP 1.000 0.951 0.653
Correlation with NII 0.653 0.410 1.000
Data are quarterly U.S., 1954.1 – 2002.4, seasonally adjusted and chained in 1996 dollars. GDP
and final sales are reported as percentage standard deviations, detrended using a Hodrick-
Prescott filter with a weight of 1600.  Net inventory investment in private nonfarm inventories
xt, is detrended relative to GDP; the detrended series is (xt  - xt) / yt,  where xt is the HP-trend
of the series and yt is the trend for GDP .  Business Review  Q3  2003   43 www.phil.frb.org
5 If the firm chooses to employ its workers for
four weeks, having them work just 30 hours
each week, it will have to pay them for 38.5
hours a week, or 154 hours in total, for a
total cost of $1540.  If, instead, the firm has
them work full time for 40 hours during the
first three weeks, then lays them off during
the fourth week, it has to pay them for only
120 hours, or $1200 in total.
6 However, V.V. Chari of the University of
Minnesota and the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis and Mitchell Berlin of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia have
independently noted, in separate discussions
with me, that long-term relationships between
sellers and manufacturers may imply that the
production-smoothing model is applicable to
retail and wholesale inventories.  In such
settings, manufacturers may store their
finished goods with sellers.
One possible production plan would be
to employ all workers for only 30 hours
a week. But if, instead, they are
employed full time for three weeks,
then laid off every fourth week, the
manufacturer will have lower labor
costs. Moreover, this second option
implies that production varies across
weeks, while sales do not. Production
has become more variable than sales
because of increasing returns.5
Martin Eichenbaum considers
an alternative: the effect of random
changes in unit costs that are indepen-
dent of the quantity produced. This
theory is different from the assumption
of increasing returns; it does not assume
that unit costs fall with quantity
produced but that they rise and fall
unexpectedly over time. Examples of
such unexpected changes in firms’
production costs include, but are not
limited to, changes in input prices, such
as a rise in oil prices, and poor weather.
A sudden rise in oil prices that is not
expected to last very long may give a
transportation company an incentive to
temporarily reduce its shipments. An
unexpectedly cold winter will lead
construction companies to defer as
much building as they can. Such
random changes in costs lead to random
changes in production and do so
independently of fluctuations in sales.
Thus, production becomes more volatile,
and if these cost shocks are sufficiently
large, it may become more volatile than
sales.
Both Ramey’s increasing
returns model and Eichenbaum’s cost
shocks model modify the production-
smoothing model, making it more
consistent with the data. In each
instance, the positive co-movement
between final sales and inventory
investment is restored, and production
becomes more variable than sales.
Regardless of whether the
production-smoothing model can be
reconciled to observation, a second
difficulty remains. This model may
apply to a relatively small fraction of the
firms that hold inventories because the
model is based on a manufacturing firm
that produces, then stores as inventories,
finished goods that it will sell later.
Inventories of finished manu-
factured goods are only 13 percent of
the total stock of inventories in the
economy (Table 2). The remaining
two-thirds of inventories held in the
manufacturing sector are intermediate
inputs into production.  The inventories
held in the wholesale and retail sectors
are largely finished goods, but produc-
tion smoothing may not be best suited
to explain the inventories held in these
sectors. One reason is that firms in
these sectors do not produce the goods
they sell.6
THE (S,s) MODEL OF
INVENTORY ACCUMULATION
Surprisingly, given its wide-
spread use by macroeconomists studying
inventory accumulation, the original
model developed by economists to
TABLE 2
Sectoral Distribution of Private Nonfarm Inventories
Percentage of Total STD Correlation (Inventory
Stock of Inventories (Inventory Investment) Investment, GDP)
Manufacturing 37 0.14 0.65
finished goods 13
work in process 12
materials & supplies 12
Trade
retail 26 0.12 0.32
wholesale 26 0.09 0.35
Other 11
Column 3, the percentages of the total stock of inventories, is taken from Ramey and West, 869, Table 4.44   Q3  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
words, inventories will tend to move
with sales when the change in sales itself
is large. Smaller increases in sales may be
associated with a net reduction in total
inventory holdings. Thus, the model
predicts an interesting nonlinearity: we
should expect inventories and sales to
rise together when sales rise by a large
amount, but the correlation may be
negative for a small rise in sales.
In a formal analysis of (S, s)
retail inventories, Andrew Caplin
proved a positive correlation between
final sales and inventory investment. For
the reasons described above, this positive
correlation raised the variability of
production above that of sales.  Caplin
concluded, “The (S, s) theory thus
contradicts the widely held notion that
retail sector inventories act as a buffer,
protecting manufacturers from fluctuat-
ing sales.”7  Caplin’s work suggests that
inventories may indeed destabilize the
economy. However, his seminal analysis
of retail sector inventories took final
sales as given, rather than allowing them
to be determined along with inventories,
in general equilibrium. In general
equilibrium, a complete assessment of
the role of inventories would have to
allow for feedback effects from the rest
of the economy, which may change the
behavior of final sales.
(S, s) Inventories in a Model
of the Business Cycle. The (S, s)
model of inventories provides us with a
framework, broadly consistent with
observation, to study the role of
inventories over the business cycle. For
inventories to fluctuate between an
upper level labeled S and a lower level
labeled s —  hence, the conventional
label (S, s).  S represents the level of
inventories held by the firm after it has
restocked.  It then allows its stock to fall
over time until it reaches the threshold s.
At that time, another order is placed.
Sometimes, the order costs are called
adjustment costs.
The (S, s) model is flexible
enough to be consistent with either
positive or negative correlations between
sales and inventories. To see this, assume
there’s a short-term increase in sales
across a large number of firms selling the
same product. Firms will reduce their
inventories to meet the rise in sales. For
some firms, the net effect is to reduce
inventories. For firms with already low
levels of inventories, this initial reduc-
tion means they reach their order
threshold, s. As a result, they will adjust
their inventories upward, raising them to
S. Overall, some firms will increase
inventories when sales increase, while
others will reduce them. On average,
the rise in sales could be associated with
either an increase or a decrease in net
inventory investment, depending on the
size of the demand shock and different
firms’ current levels of inventories.
There is an interesting subtlety
to the reasoning outlined above. A rise
in the typical firm’s inventories along
with a rise in sales is more likely if many
firms hit their re-ordering level. This is
more likely to be the case when the
increase in sales itself is large.  Such
large increases in sales move most firms
to their lower threshold for inventories,
causing them to readjust. In other
explain firms’ holdings of inventories was
not the production-smoothing model. It
was the (S, s) model first formulated by
Herbert Scarf of Yale University. While
macroeconomists do not commonly use
this model, Alan Blinder and Louis
Maccini have argued that the (S, s)
model provides a natural resolution to
the empirical inconsistencies of the basic
production-smoothing model without
relying on increasing returns or cost
shocks.
The (S,s) model obtains very
different predictions because adjust-
ment costs operate differently. Instead of
assuming that adjustment costs increase
smoothly with changes in production, in
the (S, s) model, adjustments lead to
fixed costs. Moreover, instead of arising
during production, these costs are
incurred when a firm either orders or
undertakes delivery of goods.
A firm facing such costs will
tend to order the relevant goods in large
quantities but infrequently. By ordering
more than is needed at any one time,
the firm can hold stocks of the goods,
thereby avoiding fixed order costs
because the firm orders less frequently.
By holding these stocks of goods, the
firm reduces the overall cost of ordering.
For example, consider Honda
again.  In deciding the size of the
quarterly steel order for Honda’s Ohio
plant, a manager must go over last
quarter’s production and forecast future
sales.  This takes a certain amount of
managerial time that is largely indepen-
dent of the size of the steel order. As
such, the costs of ordering steel, which
include the labor costs associated with
the manager’s efforts, are fixed costs.
These costs are reduced when the firm
orders infrequently — that is, when it
places orders of sufficient size so as to
not have to order again for some time. In
other words, Honda will hold inventories
of steel to reduce the fixed costs of
ordering. As Herbert Scarf proved, a
firm facing such fixed costs will allow its
7 See page 1396, paragraph 2, of Caplin’s
article.
Overall, some firms will increase inventories
when sales increase, while others will
reduce them.  Business Review  Q3  2003   45 www.phil.frb.org
example, it allows us to examine the
central question of whether inventories
destabilize the economy and exacerbate
the movements in GDP . In a recent
paper, Julia Thomas and I did just that.
Our approach, in common
with other modern macroeconomic
analysis, relied on building a model of
the macroeconomy in which aggregate
economic variables, such as production,
consumption, investment, and employ-
ment, are the result of interactions
between households and firms, much as
in the actual economy.  The essential
feature of our model is that, in keeping
with modern practice, we model the
decisions of individual households and
firms, summing these decisions to arrive
at aggregate variables for the economy
as a whole.
Our model included an (S, s)
model of a firm’s inventory investment.
Simulating our model to produce
artificial business cycles, we were able to
explain roughly one-half of the observed
volatility of inventory investment. More
important, inventory investment and
final sales moved together, as in the
data, and production, as a result, was
more volatile than sales. We also found
that the relationship between invento-
ries and GDP is not as straightforward as
you might expect.
We compared two model
economies, identical in most fundamen-
tals, but with one difference. Firms in
one economy had no adjustment costs
and, thus, no need to hold inventories.
Firms in the second economy faced the
costs of purchasing inputs and, thus, had
an incentive to hold inventories using an
(S, s) rule, as described above. In this
setting, we asked the question: If an
economist were to observe two econo-
mies with firms and consumers that
were essentially identical, but firms in
one economy held higher inventory
levels than firms in another economy,
should we expect to observe more
volatile sales in the economy with
inventories?
Our answer is that there are
really two effects.  The first is straight-
forward.  Remember the relationship
GDP = Final Sales + Net Inventory
Investment. As we discussed above, net
inventory investment in the data is
procyclical and volatile. It is also
positively correlated with final sales.
This tends to raise the variability of GDP
above that of final sales.  Increases in
final sales are associated with increases
in inventory investment, and given that
both rise simultaneously, GDP rises more
than final sales. This effect is in our
model.
However, our model identified
a second effect: the introduction of
inventories reduces the volatility of final
sales. Firms facing adjustment costs —
the reason for the inventories in the first
place — change production levels less
frequently. This tends to offset the
increase in the variability of GDP .
Certainly, the introduction of invento-
ries raised the variability of GDP
directly, but there was an offsetting
change in the volatility of final sales.
When the first effect domi-
nates, more inventories lead to more
volatile sales and increases in the
variability of GDP .  In contrast, when the
second effect dominates, higher levels of
inventories actually reduce the volatility
of sales and, thus, GDP .  Which effect
dominates depends on how the many
parameters of our model interact;
however, we often found cases where
increases in the level of inventories
reduced the variability of GDP .
CONCLUSION
Economics is full of puzzles,
some of which take the form of
disparities between the best available
models and macroeconomic data.  The
production-smoothing model of
inventory investment is an example of
such a puzzle.
Inventory investment is pro-
cyclical and very volatile. Furthermore,
it is positively correlated with final sales.
As a result, the sum of these two objects,
GDP , is more volatile than sales. The
production-smoothing model assumes
that since production is costly to adjust,
firms hold inventories to smooth
fluctuations in sales. The result is that
simple versions of the model predict that
production is less volatile than sales.
Some recent research has
focused on alternative explanations of
why firms hold inventories, and this has
led to a renewed emphasis on the (S, s)
model of inventory investment. The
(S, s) model, which replaces the
assumption that production is costly to
adjust with the alternative assumption
that there are costs of ordering goods,
may overturn our thinking of inventories
as existing to buffer changes in sales. B R46   Q3  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
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